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DID MILITARY JUSTICE FAIL OR PREVAIL?
Robinson 0. Everett*

SoN THANG: AN AMERICAN WAR CRIME. By Gary D. Solis. An
napolis: Naval Institute Press. 1997. Pp. xix, 299. $29.95.
The subject of war crimes is now receiving significant attention.
On March 13, 1998, the United States Senate, by a vote of 93-0,
adopted a resolution urging the President to call on the- United Na
tions to create a tribunal to indict and try Saddam Hussein for his
"crimes against humanity."1 In the recent past, United Nations
tribunals have tried crimes against humanity perpetrated in the for
mer Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.
With Administration backing, Congress has also recently en
acted legislation intended to confer jurisdiction on the federal dis
trict courts to try certain war crimes of which American nationals
are perpetrators or victims. The War Crimes Act of 19962 - which
is based on the power of Congress to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations3 - originally concerned "grave
breaches" of only the Geneva Convention of 1949; but, as later
amended, it punishes violations of both the Geneva and Hague
Conventions. Congress apparently intended this grant of war crime
jurisdiction to federal district courts to supplement, not supersede,
the jurisdiction over violations of the law of war - part of the law
of nations - long exercised by American military commissions and
general courts-martial.4
The War Crimes Act was prompted by the experience of a for
mer Air Force pilot, who, after being shot down and spending sev
eral years in a North Vietnamese prison, was concerned about the
seeming absence of statutory authorization for the punishment of
persons who mistreat prisoners of war.5 Certainly the concern
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Military Appeals 19801990; Founder, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security at Duke University School of
Law. A.B. 1947, J.D. 1950, Harvard; LL.M. 1959, Duke. - Ed.
1. S. Con. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted). See Senate Votes to Try Saddam for War
Crimes, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 14, 1998, at A6.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 {1998)(codifying the War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended by Ex
panded War Crimes Act of 1997).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
4. See Article 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 818 {1994); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
5. How the former pilot, Mike Cronin, persuaded a freshman Congressman, Walter
Jones, Jr. (R, N.C.), to introduce the war crimes bill and how Jones, in turn, obtained bicam
eral approval of the legislation within a few months is itself a fascinating story - which
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about the welfare of prisoners of war is quite appropriate - and
perhaps overdue.6
Although the impetus for recent war crimes legislation has been
a perceived need to assure the availability of a forum to try persons
who commit war crimes against American victims, we must never
overlook the possibility that Americans may perpetrate war crimes
against others. The recent commemoration of the thirtieth anniver
sary of the My Lai Massacre, which took place on March 16, 1968, is
one reminder of this possibility.7 Publication of Son Thang: An
American War Crime, Gary D. Solis's gripping account of an inci
dent that took place almost two years after My Lai, provides
another.
DEATH COMES TO SON THANG
On the evening of February 19, 1970, a five-man patrol went out
from Marine Company B of the 1/7 Battalion to search for Viet
Cong activity. At the time - and later during court-martial pro
ceedings - the patrol was referred to as a "killer team," a term that
does not appear in any Marine Corps manual or instruction. Ac
cording to Solis, the term was "essentially unique" to the battalion
in which these five Marines were serving (p. 29). One platoon ser
geant defined the concept quite simply: "They go out in small
teams of four to five men and search out hamlets for weapons, rice,
different types of caches, and to make contact with the enemy, and
kill as many as possible" (p. 29).
Two of the Marines involved had spotty disciplinary records.
Heading the killer team was Randall Dean Herrod, a part Creek
Indian from Calvin, Oklahoma, who had enlisted in the Marine
Corps sixteen months before. In Vietnam, Herrod had engaged in
heroic conduct - including saving the life of his platoon leader, 2d
Lt. Oliver L. North. He received the Purple Heart, was recom
mended for a Silver Star, and was promoted to lance corporal.
;However, apparently displeased with a transfer to the 1/7 Battalion,
Representative Jones narrated in November 1997 during an ABA annual conference on Na
tional Security Law in Washington, D.C.
6. On April 9, 1998, the National Prisoner of War Museum was dedicated in Anderson·
ville, Georgia, honoring the estimated 800,000 Americans who have been held as prisoners of
war. According to the National Park Service, the numbers of American prisoners of war, and
those who died in captivity, for the Civil War and the wars of this century was: "CIVIL WAR:
approximately 462,000 Confederate prisoners held, 26,000 died; 211,000 Union soldiers held,
30,000 died. WORLD WAR I: 4,120 held; 147 died. WoRLD WAR II: European Theater,
95,532 held; 1,124 died; Pacific Theater, 34,648 held, 12,935 died. KOREAN WAR: 7,140 held;
2,701 died. VIE1NAM WAR: 766 held; 114 died. PERSIAN GuLF WAR: 23 held, none died."
See Dan Sewell, Civil War Prison Camp Site of POW Museum, THE CHAITANOOGA TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1998, at Al.
7. Paul Alexander, Villages, Soldiers Revisit Memories of My Lai Massacre, THE
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 16, 1998, at Al.
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he had absented himself without leave for two months. This ab
sence resulted in a speciaf court-martial sentence of reduction in
grade to private, forfeitures of seventy dollars pay for three months,
and three months of confinement. The confinement was subse
quently suspended.s
Pvt. Michael A. Schwarz - a twenty-one-year-old from rural
Pennsylvania who was the oldest member of the killer team - had
been in Vietnam for four months, but had been in his current bat
talion for less than a week. In his prior unit, Schwarz had discipli
nary problems and had been considered for administrative
discharge because of "unfitness" (p. 38). It is not uncommon although not often admitted - to transfer disciplinary problems to
other units. Schwarz, who in his prior unit had participated in sev
eral reconnaissance patrols, was the killer team's point man, slightly
ahead of his comrades (pp. 37-38).
The other three members of the team had not previously been
in trouble as Marines. Pfcs. Thomas R. Boyd and Michael S.
Krichten were both nineteen. Boyd had been a member of the 1/7
Battalion since August 1969 and had experienced heavy combat ac
tivity in Vietnam. Krichten's record was almost identical; he had
joined the 1/7 Battalion within four days of Boyd, from which time
"they had served in the same fire team of the same squad of the
same platoon" (pp. 38-39). Eighteen-year-old Pfc. Samuel A.
Green, Jr., the only African American on the killer team, had ar
rived in Vietnam less than a month before, and this was his first
patrol. Green and Boyd had pre-enlistment problems as juveniles;
Green had spent twenty-three months in a juvenile facility. How
ever, none of the men had experienced disciplinary problems while
in the service (pp. 38-40).
Son Thang 4 was a small hamlet on the boundary of a free-fire
zone - a geographic area "designated by the South Vietnamese
government as pre-approved for the employment of military fire
and maneuver because they were ostensibly free of Vietnamese ci
vilians" (p. 40). From Hill 50, where the members of the "killer
team" were located, it was only a few hundred yards to Son Thang,
but it took about half an hour for the team to cover this distance.
As the patrol cam� to a group of the village's rough, thatch
roofed huts - generally referred to by the Marines, and many
others, as "hooches" - Schwarz, acting at Herrod's direction, en
tered one and found it empty. The team turned their attention next
to another hooch about twenty-five yards away. Surrounding it,
they called to those inside to come out. Four Vietnamese emerged
- a fifty-year-old woman, a twenty-year-old woman (who was
8. Pp. 36-37. Although Herrod and everyone else thought of him as a "private" on Feb
ruary 19, 1970, his reduction from lance corporal took effect a few days later. P. 37.
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blind), a sixteen-year-old girl, and a five-year-old girl. Schwarz
went inside to search and found no one there. At about this time,
Herrod shot one of the women and then, according to some ac
counts, gave orders to kill all of these Vietnamese. All four females
were killed by point-blank firing (pp. 44-45).
As they moved back towards the hooch Schwarz had first en
tered, the killer team heard voices from inside. This time Schwarz
found six Vietnamese women and children, and they were ordered
out. All were killed, apparently upon orders of Herrod. The dead
were a forty-three-year-old woman, a twelve-year-old boy, two ten
year-old girls and two little boys - one five and the other three
years old. Next the five Marines moved to a third hooch. This time
six more Vietnamese were killed - again all women and children
(pp. 46-47).
Marines at the team's nearby home base heard loud bursts of
gunfire and were concerned about the patrol's welfare. However,
in response to radio inquiries, the killer team reported that they had
some confirmed enemy KIAs - killed-in-action. A few minutes
later when they arrived back at their unit, Herrod and some other
members of the patrol recounted at an initial debriefing that they
had spotted some Viet Cong, set up a hasty ambush, and killed at
least six of the enemy (pp. 49-50).
Lt. Louis R. Ambort, the company commander of the five
Marines, apparently initially accepted the account they provided.
But later - prodded by questions from Maj. Richard Theer, his
battalion operations officer and an exemplary Marine - Ambort
became suspicious and further questioned the members of the
team. Now they told him that they had killed a number of women
and children after being fired upon by their victims. This explana
tion satisfied him for the moment. Theer, however, was not satis
fied. The next day, a patrol sent to Son Thang found the bodies of
sixteen women and children. Theer began his own initial investiga
tion and eventually obtained statements from the members of the
killer team that made it appear likely that serious crimes had been
committed.9
9. Pp. 51-56, 59-64. As Solis points out, commentators have differed as to whether the
murder of hundreds of Vietnamese noncombatants by Army troops at My Lai was a war
crime. Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, expressed the
view that the victims, citizens of an allied nation, South Vietnam, were not enemies protected
under the Geneva Conventions and that their murders were like other homicides involving
citizens of a host nation. P. 57. Telford Taylor, a chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, expressed
the contrary view that, since My Lai was considered to be controlled by the Viet Cong with
enemy resistance to be expected, it was "hostile territory" within the meaning of the Hague
Convention and that the laws of war applied. Id. A similar issue could be raised as to the
homicides at Son Thang - which was located only about twenty-five miles from My Lai. The
members of the killer team believed that they were killing enemies, however, and perhaps
their belief should be the governing consideration.
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As a result of Maj. Theer's investigation, members of the killer
team were charged with the murder of sixteen noncombatants in
violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. After a formal
pretrial investigation pursuant to Article 32 of the Code,10 military
judge Maj. Robert Blum11 recommended that all five killer team
members be tried by general court-martial on charges of premedi
tated murder.12
THE TRIALS

Pfc. Krichten was never tried. Following a time-honored de
fense tactic, his military counsel negotiated immunity in return for
an agreement to testify truthfully (p. 89). Kricbten, the only mem
ber of the killer team without prior civilian or military convictions,
had not been in charge and by all accounts had been less involved
in the killings than Herrod or Schwarz. Thus, he was an espedally
suitable candidate for a deal; certainly from the prosecutor's stand
point it was helpful to have an eyewitness - particularly one whose
testimony would not require an interpreter.
The charges against the other four accused were referred for
separate trial, rather than a joint trial (p. 107). This choice seems
understandable, since separate trials would probably be simpler for
the judge and prosecutor, as well as less confusing for the triers of
fact. Moreover, a joint trial would have presented issues as to the
admissibility and use of the incriminating statements made by the
various accused.13 In separate trials the statements made by each
10. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1994).

Unless waived by an accused, a pretrial investigation under

Article 32 of the UCMJ is a prerequisite for trial by a general court-martial. Unlike a grand
jury, its proceedings are open, the accused is represented by counsel, and the defense has a
right to cross-examine government witnesses and present its own evidence. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 832(b) (1994). However, even if the pretrial investigating officer recommends against trial,
this recommendation is not binding on the commander who convenes a general court-mar
tial. See 10 U.S.C. § 832, 834 (1994).

11. Maj. Blum had also been the military judge who tried Herrod for his unauthorized
absence. P. 36.
12. Lt Ambort, company commander of the killer team members, was separately
charged with failure to obey a division order to report any incident thought to be a war
crime; dereliction of duty for failing to take effective measures to minimize noncombatant
casualties and not ensuring that his men were aware of the rules of engagement; and making
a false official statement as to one matter concerning the killer team's activities. P. 91. These
charges were investigated under Article 32 by Lt. Col. James P. King - who years later
served as the senior Marine judge advocate. Pp. 93, 100. King recommended nonjudicial
punishment for Lt. Ambort for making a false official statement. P. 102. In accordance with
this recommendation, Ambort received a letter of reprimand - which inevitably has a very
adverse effect on the career of a Marine officer - rather than facing trial by general court
martial on some theory that, as commander of the members of the killer team, he bore re
sponsibility for the sixteen murders.
13. Cf.

Bruton v. United States,

391

U.S.

123 (1968).
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accused could be received against that accused without a limiting
instruction.14
The first trial was that of Pfc. Schwarz. This accused, whose IQ
was far below average, was among Marines who had been enlisted
under relaxed recruiting standards then in effect in the Armed
Services.ls From the beginning, the trial did not go well for him.
Schwarz was represented by military counsel who unsuccessfully
made several pretrial motions, including one contesting the admissi
bility of Schwarz's pretrial statement.16 Especially damaging, how
ever, was the testimony of Krichten. He swore that he had seen
Schwarz personally participate in killing Vietnamese at the first and
third hooches. However, on cross-examination, some of Krichten's
answers tied in with a defense that Schwarz was only following or
ders (pp. 141-44).
The company commander, Lt. Ambort, testified for the defense
as to the hazards posed to the Marines by Vietnamese civilians even those nine to twelve years old. According to Ambort, his
"company policy" was to "[t]reat [noncombatants] with the utmost
of suspicion, but make sure, you know, protect them as well as you
can" (p. 148). With this and other testimony, the defense sought to
suggest that the Son Thang victims were not necessarily innocents.
Schwarz himself took the stand - partly in order to explain his
incriminating pretrial written statement. His testimony suggested
that to some extent his shooting of the civilians had been a response
to a directive to the killer team from their leader, Pvt. Herrod. Sub
sequently, in a forceful argument, military defense counsel con
tended that Schwarz had been acting under a perceived duty to
obey an order from the leader of the patrol (pp. 158-64).
The members of the general court-martial received detailed in
structions from the military judge on such matters as aiding and
abetting, mistake of fact, extent of any duty to obey illegal orders,
testimony of an accomplice, and presumption of innocence. After
deliberating, the officers composing the court-martial found
14. An enlisted defendant is tried by a general court·martial composed solely of officers,
unless the defendant exercises the statutory right to request that at least one·third of the
court-martial members be enlisted persons. See Article 25{c){1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 825{c){1) (1994). Thus, if there are two defendants, and either submits a request for en
listed members, that defendant will be tried by a court with some enlisted members and the
co-defendant will be tried separately by an all-officer court. Consequently, a defendant can
obtain a severance from a co-defendant by requesting enlisted members.
15. Pp. 108, 116. In October, 1966, the Department of Defense directed that 100,000
persons with "category four" intelligence be enlisted annually - even though some better
qualified volunteers would have to be turned aside to meet this quota. The effect of "Project
100,000" on discipline was harmful. See pp. 116-18.
16. Under Article 31 of the Uniform Code, pretrial warning requirements are imposed
which go far beyond those required by Miranda. See 10 U.S.C. § 831 {1994). One issue
concerned compliance with Article 31 in taking Schwarz's statement which the government
offered.

May 1998]

War Crimes

1427

Schwarz guilty of premeditated murder of the twelve Vietnamese at
the second and third hooches.17 A sentence of life imprisonment
was then imposed (p. 185).
Pfc. Boyd, whose trial commenced soon after that of Schwarz,
was also a Project 100,000 recruit. However, unlike Schwarz, the
charges against him were for unpremeditated, rather than premedi
tated, murder.18 Moreover, unlike Schwarz, he was represented not
only by a Marine lawyer but also by a civilian attorney - Howard
Trochman, who was from Boyd's hometown, Evansville, Indiana,
and was an avowed critic of the Vietnam War. Trochman neither
asked nor received compensation for his representation, and he
even paid his own expenses (pp. 189-91).
Lt. Col. Paul A. St. Amour, the military judge who had tried
Schwarz, was also to preside over Boyd's trial. From his observa
tion of St. Amour during the preceding trial and his evaluation of
the attitude of typical court-martial members, Trochman decided to
gamble on a trial by judge alone (p. 192).
The Government case was much the same as in the trial of
Schwarz. However, Krichten, who was a close friend of Boyd, of
fered testimony indicating that the accused had fired over the head
of the civilians and had consciously avoided killing any of them.
Furthermore, Boyd's own testimony that he had religious convic
tions against killing and had not fired at the Vietnamese was cor
roborated by others. Because of a reasonable doubt as to Boyd's
guilt, the military judge acquitted him of all charges (pp. 196-99).
On August 13, 1970, seven weeks after Boyd's acquittal and less
than six months after the killings, Pfc. Green's trial began for six
teen unpremeditated murders. His military defense counsel offered
the defense that Green had not actually shot anyone and that, with
no combat experience before the Son Thang incident, he was too
junior and inexperienced to be considered an aider and abettor.
Green decided to exercise his statutory right to have enlisted mem
bers of his court-martial and, after challenges had been exercised,
he was tried by a court-martial with three officer members and two
senior noncommissioned officers. Lt. Col. St. Amour was again the
military judge. Rather than seeking to show that Green personally
killed anyone, the prosecutor focused on showing that Green
17. P. 183. Schwarz was not, however, found guilty of the first four murders. In a general
or special court-martial, findings of guilt require only a two-thirds vote, rather than unanim
ity. See Article 52, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1994).
18. Maj. Blum had recommended that all five members of the killer team be tried for
premeditated murder. While this recommendation was followed with Schwarz and Herrod,
p. 225, Boyd and Green were charged only with unpremeditated murder. Pp. 194, 206.
Although Solis does not explain the reason for this difference in the gravity of the charges, it
is consistent with the differences in the roles of the five Marines. Schwarz was the leader of
the killer team, and Herrod, the point man, was more directly linked with the killings than
either Boyd or Green.
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shared in the criminal purpose and thus was liable as an aider and
abettor. Krichten's testimony that Green had fired at all three
hooches supported this theory (pp. 204-08).
The defense emphasized, on the other hand, that Herrod and
Schwarz had been the primary actors and Green had been in the
background. Green, testifying in his own defense, maintained that
although he had fired, he purposely aimed to miss and that he had
been acting only upon the repeated orders of Herrod, whom he be
lieved to be an experienced leader (p. 207). The military judge's
instructions basically followed those given in the trial of Schwarz.19
The members of the court-martial found Green guilty of fifteen
counts of unpremeditated murder. The sentence adjudged by the
members was five years confinement and a dishonorable dis
charge.20 Green believed the sentence to be excessive. However,
to others - including myself - it appears remarkably lenient. In
this instance, as Solis agrees, any effort to portray Green, the only
African American on the "killer team," as a victim of racial bias
would lack foundation in fact (pp. 210-12).
The case of Pvt. Herrod, the last to be tried, aroused great inter
est in his home state of Oklahoma, and 160,000 citizens signed a
petition in his behalf that was sent to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps (pp. 217-18). Like Boyd, Herrod received uncom
pensated representation, from experienced Oklahoma civilian at
torneys.21 Additionally, 1st Lt. Oliver North, whose life Herrod
had saved, assisted the defense team in every way possible. Mean
while, Lt. Col. St. Amour had been unexpectedly transferred to Ja
pan; and Navy Commander Keith Lawrence was sent from the
Philippines to act as military judge for Herrod, who was charged
with sixteen premeditated murders. Herrod was tried by a panel of
seven officers - a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, four majors, and a
captain22 - all of whom had combat experience. In North's view,
19. As Solis notes, the defense counsel failed to request an instruction on accomplice
testimony - despite being almost invited by the judge to do so. P. 179. He offers no expla
nation for this omission, and none readily occurs to me.
20. In a court-martial, if the members of the court-martial decide on guilt or innocence,
they also adjudge the sentence. See Article 52, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 852(b) (1994). There is
no way for a servicemember to have the members determine guilt and the judge adjudge
sentence. I have strongly urged a change of the Uniform Code in this regard.
21. Denzil D. Garrison, Republican leader of the Oklahoma state senate, was defending
the nephew of a man who had helped save his life during the Korean war. He recruited Gene
Stipe, a Democratic state senator, who was a seasoned defense attorney with some prior
military trial experience. Each lawyer paid his own way to Vietnam. Later, there were two
other Oklahoma volunteers. Pp. 218-20.
22. The panel had originally consisted of eight members, but a lieutenant colonel had
been challenged. P. 229. In a general court-martial, the Government and the defense each
have a peremptory challenge. Although Solis does not state specifically that the member was
removed by a defense challenge, I assume this occurred because this would be consistent with
the "numbers game" played by counsel in general courts-martial. Since a finding of guilty
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this was advantageous to the accused, because "only men who had
served in combat could appreciate the pressures that Herrod must
have been under" (p. 229).
Krichten's testimony was detailed and damaging to Herrod. In
a 1996 letter to Solis, defense attorney Garrison referred to the
Government's presentation as a "sophomoric prosecution."23 How
ever, Solis's recital of Krichten's testimony suggests to me a con
trary conclusion. In any event, the defense countered with evidence
about extensive Viet Cong activity in the Son Thang area a few days
before and even evidence suggesting that the patrol itself had been
fired upon. Herrod's former battalion commander testified for the
defense as to the difficult situation in which the members of the
patrol found themselves. Oliver North, who had paid his own way
to Vietnam to testify for Herrod, was an effective character witness.
Herrod, whose military intelligence test scores were quite high,
also testified effectively on his own behalf. According to him, there
had been some enemy fire, which his team had returned; and some
civilians were killed in the crossfire. He asserted in his defense, "I
do not now, and I did not then, feel that I had killed anyone it
wasn't necessary to kill" (p. 245). Thereafter, Dr. Hayden Dona
hue, a prominent Oklahoma psychiatrist, and an expert on battle
fatigue among World War II veterans, gave his opinion that Herrod
probably was suffering from this condition at the time of the kill
ings. Having been in extensive combat and faced death on a daily
basis, Herrod's reasoning had been supplanted by instinct.24
After brief rebuttal evidence, the case was presented to the
members of the court-martial. Apparently they were greatly im
pressed by the skill of the defense team and, on the other hand,
considered the Government's case to be weak. Since there was less
than the necessary two-thirds vote to convict of premeditated mur
der, the panel considered lesser included offenses and decided on
an acquittal across the board.25 Solis poses the question of whether
jury nullification had been operative (p. 256).

must be rendered by a two-thirds vote, the mathematical odds favor an accused tried by
seven members than by six or nine; challenges are often exercised with this in mind.

23. Letter from Denzil Garrison to Gary Solis (Jan.

4,

1996).

24.

Solis expresses well-grounded doubt that the doctor correctly arrived at his diagnosis
of battle fatigue. Pp. 247-48.

25. Pp. 253-55. Solis - apparently on the basis of interviews conducted many years later
with some of the court members - recounts that initially the vote was four to three on the
premeditated murder charge, although memories differed as to whether the majority was for
conviction or acquittal. "Unaccountably, as the seven officers considered the lesser offenses,
the vote swung not toward conviction of a less serious charge, as one would expect, but more
strongly toward acquittal." Pp. 254-55.
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THE AFrnRMATH
In September 1970
shortly after his acquittal - Herrod re
turned to the United States for out-processing from the Marine
Corps. His twenty-two months as a Marine had included fifteen
months in Vietnam, including two months of unauthorized absence
and six months of pretrial confinement. In December 1970, he fi
nally received the Silver Star for which he had been recommended
long before. Around the same time, Krichten and Boyd both com
pleted their Vietnam tours of duty and were honorably discharged.
Schwarz and Green were transferred to a naval prison in Ports
mouth, New Hampshire to serve their respective sentences.
During the Vietnam War twenty-seven Marines were convicted
of murder and other crimes against civilians, and only in seven cases
was confinement adjudged for less than ten years. Schwarz's life
sentence was not unusually severe but Green's sentence was re
markably lenient.26 It was the task of Maj. Gen. Charles F. Wid
decke, the commanding general of the First Marine Division who
had convened the four general courts-martial, to review the
Schwarz and Green convictions. In light of Herrod's acquittal,
Widdecke's staff judge advocate - his legal advisor - recom
mended that Schwarz's sentence be reduced to twenty years con
finement. Displaying extraordinary leniency toward a Marine
convicted of fifteen premeditated murders, the general reduced the
confinement from life to one year. He similarly reduced Green's
sentence. Thereafter, the Navy Court of Military Review affirmed
the findings of guilt and the reduced sentences. Both Schwarz and
Green received dishonorable discharges.
Subsequently, the convictions and sentences, as reduced, of
Schwarz and Green were affirmed on appeal. No clemency was
granted either accused by the Navy Discharge Review Board which could have changed the characterization of the dishonorable
discharge. Later, James H. Webb, who had been a contemporary of
Oliver North at the Naval Academy and also served as a Marine
officer in Vietnam, took a great personal interest in Green's case
and helped present it to the Board for Correction of Naval
Records.27 In 1978, that Board changed Green's dishonorable dis
charge to a general discharge - which, although not an "honorable
discharge," is "under honorable conditions." Green never learned
of this partial vindication because in 1975 he had killed himself af-

26. The sentences adjudged against the twenty-seven Marines were not extraordinary
when compared with sentences of civilian courts for similar misconduct. Pp. 266·68.
27. Pp. 283, 289. Webb, who in 1978 authored Fields ofFire, a book based on his exper
iences in Vietnam, at a later time became Secretary of the Navy. Pp. 287-88. See JAMBS H.
WEBB, FIELDS OF FIRE: A NOVEL (1978).
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ter unsuccessfully seeking to attack his court-martial conviction col
laterally in a federal district court (p. 291).
CONCLUSIONS
Solis's qualifications to write Son Thang are unique. He served
in the Marine Corps for twenty-six years, including two tours of
duty in Vietnam as an assault amphibian officer - the first in 1964
as a platoon leader and the second in 1966 as a company com
mander. Subsequently, after becoming a lawyer, he served for
more than eighteen years as a judge advocate, tried more than 450
cases as chief prosecutor for the First and Third Marine Divisions,
and later served two terms as a general court-martial judge before
retiring as a lieutenant colonel in 1989. His 1989 book, Marines and
Military Law in Vietnam, is an excellent history of Marine Corps
courts-martial in that conflict (pp. xiii-xv).

Probably as a result of his own unique experience, Solis does a
remarkable job of providing his readers an understanding of the
mental processes of the five members of the killer team. His ac
count of the investigation that was undertaken makes clear that at least in some instances - commanders and military lawyers are
willing to unearth and disclose the possible existence of embarrass
ing war crimes perpetrated by American servicemembers.28 His ex
planation of the American military justice system is understandable
and free of military jargon. His insights into the tactics of both
prosecutors and defense counsel are excellent.

Solis concludes that although the Son Thang "trials were re
minders of humanity's aspiration to do justice," on a more basic
level "the Son Thang trials were a failure" (p. 293). The results of
the trials show that the military justice system carried out its
prosecutorial function "deficiently, its effort wanting in several sig
nificant respects" (p. 293). In his view, the potential significance of
the suspected offenses was such that Marine lawyers should have
been involved initially in taking the statements of the killer team
and of other potential witnesses. The absence of this participation
created a significant risk that the statements obtained would be
held inadmissible at trial - and indeed some statements were ob
jected to, although unsuccessfully. Solis also believes that more ex
perienced lawyers should have been assigned to both prosecute and
defend the general courts-martial arising out of Son Thang. He
writes, "If the 1st Division lacked the requisite specialists, then
28. Maj. Robert Blum, who conducted the pretrial investigation of the Son Thang kill
ings, later served as a military judge in the Marine Corps and retired as a colonel. P. 76. In
1957, Blum was my student in a military law seminar at the U.N.C. School of Law, and I had
a great respect for his ability and seriousness of purpose. I was pleased that my favorable
impression then is confirmed by Solis's account of the pretrial investigation Blum conducted.
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prosecutors, defenders, and administrators sufficient to the task
should have been brought to Hill 327 from other in-country com
mands, even from state-side commands, if necessary. It had been
done before when multiple homicides were to be tried" (p. 294).
Solis criticizes the prosecution for granting Krichten immunity too
quickly and then not adequately monitoring him.29 Finally, Solis
notes the question raised by some experienced judge advocates as
to whether the military justice system can function effectively under
wartime conditions in places like Vietnam (p. 296).
Without being Pollyannish, I must express my own view that
under the circumstances the military justice system worked remark
ably well at Son Thang - especially when one considers that the
Military Justice Act of 1968 had made major changes in the system
only a few months before the Son Thang killings and that those
changes were still being assimilated. Admittedly, any prosecutorial
decision to grant immunity - either testimonial or transactional to a co-accused has a potential for inequity; but I am hesitant to
criticize the choice made to immunize Pfc. Krichten.30 I also do not
criticize the prosecution's use of separate trials. Separate trials,
rather than a joint trial, do create additional administrative burdens
for the prosecution and permit defense counsel in the later cases to
learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. However, in this in
stance I believe the use of separate trials was a wise choice - espe
cially since any accused could have obtained an automatic
severance by exercising his statutory right to have enlisted members
on his court. Moreover, the wisdom of the choice to try Schwarz
first was confirmed by his conviction of twelve premeditated
murders and the life sentence the court-martial handed down.31
Although the success of the civilian counsel in obtaining acquit
tals for Boyd and Herrod would suggest the wisdom of utilizing the
services of such attorneys - especially if rendered at the attorney's
own expense - I would not infer that the military lawyers who
prosecuted were simply outmatched. For example, even in a case
involving a war crime, the accused usually has not been recom
mended for a Silver Star and cannot call as a character witness
someone - in this instance Oliver North - whose life he has saved
29. P. 295. Moreover, Solis would have referred to trial the charges against Lt. Ambort
on the premise that this company commander "like Lieutenant Calley's superior, Captain
Medina, should have been made to account for his actions. If, like Medina, he be acquitted,
so be it." Pp. 295-96.
30. Admittedly, at Boyd's trial the prosecutor - a different prosecutor from the one who
tried Schwarz - was apparently surprised by Krichten's favorable testimony to his good
friend Boyd; and perhaps this reflected inadequate preparation. Pp. 196-97. However, if a
prosecutor tries to control an immunized witness - which Solis seems to suggest be done this tactic may give rise to persuasive defense complaints.
31. Presumably, these favorable results would have strengthened the Government's hand
for plea-bargaining purposes.
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in combat. Moreover, that psychiatric testimony on battle fatigue
might create a doubt as to the mens rea of an accused should not be
too surprising in an era when acceptance of the abuse excuse is not
uncommon.
In short - with the possible exception of General Widdecke's
extraordinary reduction in Schwarz's sentence from life imprison
ment to one year of confinement - I would not view the outcome
of the Son Thang trials as examples of "so-called military justice."32
Instead the results fall within the wide range not uncommon for
contested cases in many contemporary systems of justice. Cer
tainly, none of these trials could be unfavorably compared with that
of O.J. Simpson. Of course, I do not want to suggest that the mili
tary justice system was flawless - whether in 1970 or today. Many
improvements have been made in the interval; and others are prob
ably needed.33 For example, in combat areas some streamlining of
military justice might be appropriate to conserve resources.34
The most important achievement of Solis's Son Thang, however,
is to make clear that Americans in uniform, like soldiers from other
countries, may commit war crimes. In most instances, as in the tri
als at Son Thang, the offenses committed will not be charged as war
crimes -:---- that is, the accused will not be prosecuted under provi
sions dealing with violations of the law of war based on congres
sional power under Article I, section 8, clause 10. Instead, where
servicemembers on active duty are involved, the charges will be
preferred under routinely used articles of the Uniform Code of Mil
itary Justice - such as Article 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (murder), or
Article 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (rape)35 - which rely on congressional
power " [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces."36 Regardless, however, of the charge that
might be preferred or of the court, military or civilian, that might
try the case, it is important that Americans be constantly aware that
our own servicemembers have committed war crimes in the past
32. Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 n.7
(1969), overmled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 {1987), refers to "so-called military
justice." To me, this description seems unfair.
33. For example, I have already noted that in my opinion the Uniform Code should be
modified to allow the accused an opportunity to obtain a result available in any federal crimi
nal trial - namely, trial by jury (court-martial members) and sentencing by judge. See supra
note 20.
34. Perhaps special courts-martial - which can impose punishments of up to six months
confinement, partial forfeitures of pay, reduction in grade, and a bad conduct discharge could be conducted by a military judge alone, rather than requiring the assembling of court
members.
35. However, under the "offenses not capital" clause of Article 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 {1994), a servicemember could be tried by a court-martial
for a violation of the War Crimes Act.
36. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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and may commit them in the future. This awareness will in turn
generate efforts by the armed services to screen recruits,37 to edu
cate servicemembers about conduct that might constitute a war
crime, and to explain to them that the defense of obedience to su
perior orders will not be available with respect to actions that
should reasonably be perceived to be war crimes.
Son Thang is a well-conceived and well-executed explanation of
an important event in recent American history. Readers of the
book will obtain a much better understanding of what conduct may
constitute a war crime and of the difficulties in successfully prose
cuting alleged war criminals.

37. Solis points out that two members of the killer team had scored very low in mental
tests and probably would never have been recruited under the standards usually applied by
the Armed Services. Pp. 116-18. However, it is sobering to recall that Herrod, who led the
team, had a substantially above-average grade on his military intelligence test.

